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This thesis presents an analysis of the implementation feasibility of
RAM authentication and encryption. Past research has used simulations to
establish that it is possible to authenticate and encrypt the contents of RAM
with reasonable performance penalties by using clever implementations of tree
data structures over the contents of RAM. However, previous work has largely
bypassed implementation issues such as power consumption and silicon area
required to implement the proposed schemes, leaving implementation details
unspecified. This thesis studies the implementation cost of AES-GCM hard-
ware and software solutions for memory authentication and encryption and
shows that software solutions are infeasible because they are too costly in
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With the advent of nearly ubiquitous, portable, and cheap computing,
sensitive data is increasingly put on mobile devices and remote servers. Ex-
amples of such data include health records, privileged discussions with lawyers
or caretakers, Social Security numbers and other identifying information, and
various forms of cryptographic keys. Users concerned about security typically
employ several protective methods to ensure the security of their data such
as passwords, disk encryption, and hardened software systems that have been
tested against attacks. However, for a motivated or ambitious attacker with
physical access to the system in question, these protections are frequently not
enough. An integral part of most modern computer systems is left largely
unprotected: Random Access Memory (RAM).
The “cold boot” attack has been shown to present serious troubles to
the security of data that is stored in the Dynamic RAM (DRAM) chips of
a modern computer[1]. In short, a cold boot attack exploits DRAM rema-
nence by first obtaining physical control of a computer while it is powered on,
then briefly interrupting power, rebooting with a custom operating system,
and dumping the still-remnant contents of DRAM out to permanent storage.
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Because power is only interrupted for a short period of time, the contents of
the DRAM chips are largely intact and can be mined offline for exploitative
material such as encryption keys. Variations on this attack include chilling
the DRAM modules before performing the attack (thereby slowing decay) and
physically transplanting the DRAM modules into an attacker-controlled sys-
tem, bypassing the need to reboot the attacked system into a new OS.
It should be noted that most cold boot attacks take place offline. Data
is read out of memory once and then post-processed for valuable information,
such as cipher keys.
Elbaz et al. [2], in a survey covering various hardware mechanisms for
memory authentication, also succinctly define active attacks based on spoofing,
splicing, and replay. These attacks are illustrated in Figure 1.1, adapted from
the same paper. In short, spoofing effectively replaces the contents of memory
at a specific address, splicing transposes memory contents from one address to
another, and replay changes the contents of an address to contents that were
previously observed at the same address. These attacks can be done online
and can enable attackers to influence program execution or reveal data, even
if the bus traffic is encrypted [3].
Other data leaks are possible, such as passive bus snooping, and can
be done while the system under attack is running. The original Microsoft
XboxTMwas compromised by the use of a cheap bus snooper that read a cipher
key sent in the clear between the processor and a peripheral, with no cold
boot attack needed [4]. Once this key was known, it was straightforward to
2
Figure 1.1: Spoofing (a), Splicing (b), Replay (c) Attacks on Memory (Adapted
from Elbaz et al. [2])
3
repurpose the system to run almost anything that could be compiled for it,
from new operating systems to cracked, stolen, or pirated games.
A solution to both of these types of attacks is to 1) encrypt and tag
all data that is sent to RAM and 2) authenticate and decrypt all data that is
read from RAM. Several methods for doing this are described in the survey
paper by Elbaz et al. [2]. These methods typically involve using a symmetric
key cipher to encrypt data and also building a tree structure over the contents
of RAM such that any alterations to the contents of RAM will be detected
upon reading the data back into the processor. More details will be discussed
in Chapter 2.
The objective of this thesis to provide an analysis of the feasibility
of implementation of memory encryption and authentication. This will be
accomplished by describing previous work within the field in conjunction with
a characterization of the implementation of necessary primitive operations to
provide the functionality of encryption and authentication, specifically using
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cipher operated in Galois Counter
Mode. We will describe multiple software, FPGA, and ASIC implementations
of the necessary primitives with a comparison between the different methods
in terms of implementation cost, power consumption, area cost, and feasibility
of design. This thesis does not provide a new method or process for solving the
memory encryption and authentication problem, but instead seeks to provide
more perspective on the implementation concerns of previous work.
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses previous work
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that has been done to prevent data compromise in the realms of both soft-
ware and hardware solutions. Chapter 3 covers the basics of the AES cipher
and modes of operation, specifically Galois Counter Mode. Chapter 4 covers
a software implementation and performance analysis of the necessary pieces
for encryption, decryption, and authentication based on a modified MiBench
Rijndael codebase. Chapter 5 details the operations of an open-source hard-
ware module capable of performing the necessary encryption, decryption, and
authentication procedures. In Chapter 6, a comprehensive analysis of the per-
formance, power consumption, and area consumption of all of the discussed
methods is presented. Chapter 7 lists several ways in which this work could




Various research groups have performed detailed analysis of the perfor-
mance impact of memory authentication and encryption and have devoted a
large amount of effort to reducing the performance penalty that is traded off
for security.
2.1 Tree-based Schemes for Memory Protection
One of the early models for protecting the contents of memory was to
build a Merkle Tree over the contents of RAM [5]. A Merkle Tree for memory
authentication uses a hash function applied to blocks of memory (typically
cache lines) to verify that the contents of a piece of RAM have not been
modified. Hashes of leaf nodes (cache lines) are then combined into blocks and
hashed again, with the process repeated until one final root hash is produced.
This root hash is kept on-chip at all times, while other levels of the tree are
able to be sent out to RAM and stored, with the assumption that any changes
to either data or hash values will produce a root hash that will not match the
one stored on the chip. The Merkle Tree can authenticate blocks in parallel
because all levels of the tree are available at authentication time but must
6
update the levels of the tree sequentially whenever a leaf node is changed
because of the nature of the hashing function.
To address the problems of the Merkle Tree with sequential updates,
the Parallelizable Authentication Tree (PAT) was introduced by Hall et al.
[6]. This authentication tree functions similarly to the Merkle Tree but is
designed in such a way that both authentications and updates may be done
on all levels of the tree in parallel. Nonces are used as part of generating a
Message Authentication Code (MAC) and then those nonce values form the
next level of the tree. This procedure is repeated up to the root. Because these
nonce values may be generated at any time, this scheme allows for parallel
authentication and updates, offering a significant performance improvement
over the Merkle Tree. In the best case, an authentication or update may be
performed with a latency of one operation, whereas a Merkle Tree would have
n sequential operations where n is the number of levels in the tree.
The Tamper-Evident Counter Tree (TEC-Tree) uses a primitive known
as Block-level AREA which combines both encryption and authentication into
one operation [7]. A nonce is generated and concatenated onto every data
block (cache line) and the resulting block is then encrypted with a symmetric
key cipher operating in Electronic Code Book Mode (ECB). The nonces are
then combined into new data blocks and the procedure is repeated up to the
root, forming a tree structure. The final nonce value is held on chip in secure
storage. This tree is also able to process authentication and updates in parallel,
similarly to the PAT. An added advantage of the TEC-Tree implementation is
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that the encryption scheme used provides confidentiality for all traffic to and
from memory by encrypting it before sending to external memory, something
not provided in the Merkle Tree or PAT.
Other schemes have been devised that meld facets of multiple of the
previously described schemes. The Bonsai Merkle Tree uses a MAC function
over data blocks and then stores counter values separately in memory. Those
counter values are then put together into new blocks and the same MAC is
applied, with this process repeated until a tree structure over all of the counter
values is formed [8]. Because the counter values are smaller than the data, the
tree is smaller and therefore higher-performing. Yan et al. describe using the
AES cipher in Galois Counter Mode (GCM) to both encrypt and authenticate
memory and use a novel split counter as the seed for GCM [9]. AES oper-
ated in GCM has been a NIST standard since 2007 and has become widely
regarded as having very high performance relative to the resources needed
for implementation [10] [11]. This has the advantage of both encrypting and
authenticating, similarly to TEC-Tree, and claims a low performance penalty
due to the use of a split counter and a counter cache. The hardware and
software implementations described later in this work are very similar to the
implementation assumptions detailed in Yan et al [9].
2.2 Software Protection Against Cold Boot Attacks
Previous work has addressed cold boot and physical access attacks in
software, with no hardware modifications proposed, primarily by making sure
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that sensitive data (cipher keys) never leave the boundary of the processor.
That is, software routines are handcoded into assembly as part of the operating
system such that it is provable that operations using those routines will not
let a cipher key be stored in RAM and will, instead, keep the cipher key and
all intermediate computed data in registers [12] [13]. An extension of this is to
store one “master” cipher key in registers and then to use that key to encrypt
a section of RAM or nonvolatile storage that is used in turn to store a number
of other keys for various uses, largely bypassing the problem of limited register
space. Slowdowns in cipher performance on the order of 2-7x [12] and 2-4x
[13] are reported compared against software implementations that do not rely
on keeping keys in registers.
The protections provided by these methods largely protect small keys
that are then in turn relied upon to be used to protect the contents of non-
volatile storage via disk encryption. These methods do not provide confi-
dentiality, integrity, or authentication for arbitrary contents of RAM. While
included here for completeness, these methods are not evaluated in this thesis
as they do not provide a sufficient level of protection for the problem being
considered.
2.3 Hardware Assumptions for Memory Authentication
and Encryption
Whereas software methods have the distinct advantage of not requiring
hardware or ISA modifications, they also do not provide all of the protections
9
that hardware-based solutions provide.
Kgil et al. [14] propose an architecture under the name of ChipLock.
ChipLock is based on AES for encryption and decryption and the Secure Hash
Algorithm (SHA) for verification of data. The properties of the assumed AES
unit are a latency of 32 cycles on the target system clock and a 5.3 mm2 area
in a 180nm process. The properties of the SHA unit are a latency of 160 cycles
and an area of 1.0 mm2. All cache lines are stated to be 64B in size.
Lee et al. [15] propose a secure architecture processor which selectively
encrypts and authenticates specific regions of memory based on whether or
not they are tagged to contain sensitive data. The proposed architecture
uses AES in the Cipher Block Chaining mode with a Message Authentication
Code for authentication (AES-CBC-MAC). The AES modules associated with
decryption, encryption, and MAC generation are estimated at 20, 80, and 100
processor cycles respectively. It should be noted that decryption in AES-CBC-
MAC mode may process multiple blocks in parallel, whereas encryption must
process blocks sequentially; the encryption and decryption operations are in
fact at the same speed. Therefore, there must be at least 4 separate units
employed in parallel (4 blocks of 16B each for a 64B cache line) in order to
account for the difference between encryption and decryption speeds in this
work. Overall, the overhead latencies for secure data loads, secure data stores,
and secure instruction loads are 100, 120, and 80 cycles.
Yan et al. [9] simulate a 5GHz out-of-order processor coupled with a
set of 12 AES engines operated in Galois Counter Mode (AES-GCM) that,
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together with supporting logic and a small counter cache, implements a tree-
based memory protection scheme very similar to the TEC-Tree. Each of these
engines has a 128-bit, 16-stage pipeline with a total latency of 80 processor
cycles (effectively a 1GHz AES-GCM engine). The authors state that this is
an ambitious estimate in order to account for “future technological improve-
ments.” If each of these engines were fully occupied and produced a block of
data on every 1GHz clock, each engine would then be capable of producing
128Gb of output per second. A counter cache of 32KB is coupled with the
AES-GCM engines with a block size of 64B.
Some important common characteristics to note about all of these
schemes are that they fundamentally rely upon a symmetric key block ci-
pher and some kind of hashing or MAC function to provide confidentiality,
integrity, and authentication. The best performing simulation published used
AES operated in GCM [9]. For these reasons, AES operated in GCM is used
for the remainder of this study. More specifically, this thesis studies the ci-
phering and authentication primitives and their implementation. We do not
simulate the effects of the tree-traversal algorithm or the effects of a counter
or hash cache.
These schemes also all assume that the processor is the trusted security
boundary. Anything outside of the processor is assumed fallible or insecure,
whereas the processor is assumed infallible and unable to be tampered with.
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Chapter 3
The AES Cipher and Galois Counter Mode of
Operation
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was standardized in 2001
by the United States National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
and is considered to be the modern standard for symmetric-key encryption and
decryption [10]. However, the description of AES by itself does not constitute
a secure way in which to use the cipher. To this end, the NIST also defines
various modes of operation in which to operate AES.
This Chapter will provide a high level description of the AES cipher,
including each of the four primitive operations that are part of the cipher. This
Chapter will also describe one particular mode of operation, Galois Counter
Mode, in a similar amount of detail. GCM is frequently used for its high
performance and minimal implementation cost in both hardware and software.
This was the reasoning used by several of the previous works described in
Chapter 2 for choosing a cipher and mode of operation and is why this thesis
uses AES and GCM for study.
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3.1 Advanced Encryption Standard
AES is a block cipher, meaning that it operates on a fixed size block
of data. In the case of AES, this block size is restricted to 128 bits. During
operation, the 128 bit data block is referred to as the “state” of the cipher
and is frequently considered to be a 4x4, column-major matrix of bytes. AES
operates on the state with four primitive operations: byte substitution, row
shifting, column mixing, and an XOR operation with a round key. Decryption
defines inverse operations for each of these primitives. These operations are
composed into either 10, 12, or 14 rounds, depending on the key size. Keys for
AES are either 128, 192, or 256 bits in size (corresponding to the 10, 12, and
14 round variants) and are expanded into the appropriate number of round
keys.
AES operates on the state in a defined sequence specified by the stan-
dard. First, the key is expanded according to the AES key schedule, which
uses operations similar to those defined below. This expands the 128, 192, or
256 bit key into 1280, 1536, or 1792 bits corresponding to the 10, 12, and 14
round variants, respectively. Each round consumes 128 bits of the expanded
key in the AddRoundKey step. After key expansion, the rounds are applied
to the data. The first 9, 11, or 13 rounds consist of applying AddRoundKey,
SubBytes, ShiftRows, and MixColumns in sequence. The last round differs
slightly, omitting the MixColumns step. After the last round has been applied,
the state of the cipher is output as an encrypted block. A similar process is
defined for decryption, except using the inverses defined for each step and in
13
Figure 3.1: AddRoundKey Operation of AES (Image NIST [10])
reverse order.
3.1.1 XOR With Round Key (AddRoundKey)
The AddRoundKey operation is a simple XOR operation, modulo 2,
that XORs the state of the cipher with the current round key, as defined by
the key schedule. The AddRoundKey operation is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
3.1.2 Byte Substitution (SubBytes)
The SubBytes operation is a non-linear, independent, invertible trans-
formation of each byte of the state. The substitution is constant or hardcoded
and specifications for the substitution table may be found in the NIST specifi-
cation for AES. This primitive is frequently implemented with a look-up-table,
either in hardware or software. The SubBytes operation in illustrated in Fig-
ure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: SubBytes Operation of AES (Image NIST [10])
Figure 3.3: ShiftRows Operation of AES (Image NIST [10])
3.1.3 Row Shifting (ShiftRows)
The ShiftRows operation cyclically rotates the rows of the state. The
first row is not shifted, but the second, third, and fourth rows are shifted by
one, two, and three bytes, respectively. In hardware, this operation can be
implemented with simple wiring or shift registers. In software, this operation
can be implemented with memory moves, register rotation, or can be inte-
grated with other the operations of other rounds. The ShiftRows operation is
illustrated in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.4: MixColumns Operation of AES (Single Column) (Image NIST
[10])
Figure 3.5: MixColumns Operation of AES (State Transformation) (Image
NIST [10])
3.1.4 Column Mixing (MixColumns)
The MixColumns operation is, conceptually, a matrix multiplication
that multiplies each column of the state by a fixed polynomial defined in a
Galois Field. This can be implemented directly as a multiplication over a
Galois Field in either hardware or software or, as is frequently done, accel-
erated by pre-calculating look-up-tables for the multiplication results. The
MixColumns operation is illustrated in Figures 3.4 and 3.5.
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3.2 Galois Counter Mode of Operation
The Galois Counter Mode (GCM) of operation is standardized by the
NIST [11] and is an extension of the Counter Mode (CTR) of operation. The
Counter Mode of operation is also standardized by the NIST [16] and is shortly
described below.
3.2.1 Counter Mode
CTR mode takes a block cipher, such as AES, and generates unique
input strings that are used as the input state of the cipher. Inputs are gener-
ated by incrementing a counter, leading to the name Counter Mode. After the
block cipher has generated an output, corresponding to the encrypted version
of the counter value, the output is XORed with the actual data needing to be
encrypted. Security for this mode depends on the uniqueness of the counter
values, so a sufficiently large counter must be used to avoid reuse of a value.
output = block cipher(counter) ⊕ data block (3.1)
3.2.2 Galois Counter Mode
GCM is a variant of CTR that adds assurance or authentication in ad-
dition to the confidentiality provided by CTR, when used with an appropriate
block cipher, such as AES. By using GCM, an authentication tag is generated
in addition to the encrypted data. This tag depends upon the encrypted data.
Conversely, upon decryption, the tag is supplied in addition to the encrypted
data and is used to verify the encrypted data. If the encrypted data is changed
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or is generated with a key that doesn’t match the expected key, it is expected
that the tag will not match and the corruption will be detected. GCM also
allows for the authentication of data that is not encrypted, referred to as “Ad-
ditional Authenticated Data.” This capability was not used for the work in
this thesis.
In the operation of GCM, encrypted data blocks are generated almost
identically to CTR mode, with the initial counter value generated from an
Initialization Vector (IV) and the incrementing function restricted to 32 bits.
A special block of all zeros is also encrypted using the block cipher and the
encrypted zero block is used to define the hash subkey for the following steps.
The hashing function of GCM that actually produces the tag takes
as input the special block described previously and all of the encrypted data
blocks. It iteratively calculates the following algorithm, where ⊕ indicates
XOR and • indicates multiplication over the binary Galois Field of 2128. The
particulars of this multiplication are beyond the scope of this thesis but may
be obtained by a number of books and papers on the subject [17]. A similar
algorithm is defined for authentication of an already-generated set of blocks
with an associated tag.
1. H = encrypt(zero block)
2. Y0 = zero block
3. for i = 1 to m, Yi = (Yi−1 ⊕ encrypted blocki) •H
18
Figure 3.6: GCM Hashing Function (Image NIST [11])
4. tag = Ym




To implement AES-GCM operations in software, the Rijndael bench-
mark from the Security suite of MiBench [18] was adapted to AES-GCM op-
eration. This benchmark originally implements AES in Cipher Block Chain-
ing (CBC) mode to encrypt or decrypt files stored on disk and is written in
portable C with no inline assembly code optimizations. It is a reasonably fast
implementation of AES intended for processors that do not necessarily have
specific architectural support for cryptography operations. The first major
change was to modify the benchmark to operate on blocks strictly in memory
and not through file input/output. This was done because it is a more realistic
approximation of the way in which an integrated memory authentication and
encryption processor may operate. The second major change was to replace
the CBC mode of operation with GCM. The original MiBench code does not
include libraries that implement GCM, and specifically the Galois Field Multi-
plication operation of GCM. To address this, open source code was taken from
the public domain [19] (also the original author of the code that was adapted to
make the Rijndael benchmark in MiBench) and added to the already modified
MiBench code. After all modifications, the software implemented AES-GCM
in portable C and performed all operations in-memory by repeatedly encrypt-
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ing or decrypting a variably-sized buffer for a specified number of iterations.
Because the software was implemented this way, we believe this is a reasonable
approximation of the expected performance if a generic processing core were
embedded into the memory system of a processor and applied to the task of
memory encryption and authentication. This software assumes no specialized
hardware for cryptographic primitives.
Note that the simulations and measurements in this Chapter also in-
tentionally ignore several security concerns in the interest of making a very
forgiving test setup that gives every advantage to speed to provide a reason-
able comparison point. The processors and setups described in this Chapter
require the use of main memory themselves for both instructions and data, for
example, and these concerns would have to be dealt with appropriately.
4.1 x86 C Implementation
To profile the speed of the resulting AES-GCM code, the software was
compiled with GCC v4.7.2 with -O3 optimization enabled and evaluated on
a system running Fedora 17 GNU/Linux on an Intel Core i7-2620M proces-
sor (2.7 GHz). Other optimizations specific to x86, such as -march=native,
-maes, -mpclmul, -funroll-loops, -fomit-frame-pointer and others were enabled
and tested but did not provide any noticeable speedup for the processors eval-
uated. In order to obtain reliable measurements, power throttling was disabled
through the operating system, pinning the processor to its nominal speed of
2.7 GHz. Measurements were collected by inlining the rdtsc (read timestamp
21
Table 4.1: x86 Cycles per Byte Measurements for Pure C Implementation of
AES-GCM






counter) instruction before and after the AES-GCM operation, accumulating





num iterations ∗ buf size
(4.1)
The headers controlling various optimizations internal to the code were
configured for maximum performance, enabling loop unrolling and four fixed
tables (64 KB total) in memory for encryption, decryption, and key scheduling.
Being restricted to implementation in pure C code, the speed of the software
is restricted as well. Operations on 64B buffers with a 16B tag average on the
order of 38 cycles per byte for encryption and 50 cycles per byte for decryption.
These speeds allow a throughput of 568 Mbps and 432 Mbps, respectively, per
core. Additional speeds for a sampling of buffers sized to be on the order of
cache lines are reported in Table 4.1.
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4.2 x86 Assembly Implementation
This section will describe implementations of the same AES-GCM al-
gorithms that have been enhanced with assembly-level optimizations for the
x86 ISA.Several of these results are reported from other works and not reim-
plemented for this work.
Gladman’s software, the same codebase as used in Section 4.1, also has
x86 assembly implementations of key algorithms which reduce processing costs
to approximately 22 [20] and 30 [19] cycles per byte, a significant improvement
over the results of Section 4.1.
OpenSSL v1.0.0k [21] implements several modes of operation for AES
(though not GCM for the platforms tested) and is widely used. Speed tests us-
ing the openssl speed command report a throughput of 841 Mbps (25 cycles per
byte) and 790 Mbps (27 cycles per byte) for CBC [11] and IGE [22] modes,
respectively. OpenSSL uses x86 assembly optimizations, hence the compa-
rable but improved performance over a pure C implementation described in
Section 4.1.
An Intel whitepaper [20] describes a very high-performance implemen-
tation of AES-GCM that reaches approximately 3.5 cycles per byte for per-
forming a full encryption and tag generation, albeit for a large buffer size of
16KB and processing 4 blocks in parallel. This analysis was performed on
an Intel “Westmere” server-class processor. The Westmere series of proces-
sors have a Thermal Design Power ranging from 35-130 watts. This high-
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performance implementation takes advantage of the AES and PCLMULQDQ
instruction set extensions in modern x86 processors. The AES extensions en-
able a full round of AES encryption or decryption to be issued with a single
instruction and the PCLMULQDQ extension allows for efficient multiplication
over a Galois Field, which is critical for GCM operation.
Of notable importance is that good assembly implementations of AES-
GCM operations reduce the cycles per byte processing requirement of informa-
tion by potentially an order magnitude (2-10x) compared to portable C code,
but still require the use of a high-performance architecture and potentially
dedicated instruction set extensions to extract the most performance.
4.3 Alpha/SimpleScalar/Wattch Implementation
The same codebase detailed in Section 4.1 was also compiled for the
Alpha architecture and targeted for SimpleScalar v3.0 and, specifically, Wattch
v1.02 [23] [24]. Analysis with Wattch indicates that a software implementation
of this type of encryption and authentication process is very expensive in terms
of power. Configured similarly to a modern Intel Core i7 processor, Wattch
reports an average power consumption of more than 94 watts for a single
core running nothing but either encryption + tag generation or decryption +
authentication at 900 MHz. SimpleScalar also reports high levels of instruction
level parallelism for the AES-GCM software. A 4-wide simulated machine
averages 2.7 instructions per cycle for both encryption and decryption.
While consuming this large amount of power, the simulated processor
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is only able to sustain a throughput of 170 Mb per second with a processing
requirement of 41 cycles per byte. This is less than any of the x86 processors
measured or described previously and confirms the notion that software solu-
tions both consume large amounts of power and have restricted performance.
4.4 ARM Implementation
The previously described C code without assembly optimizations was
also ported to the ARM7 architecture and was run on the gem5 simulator (v.
stable 2012 06 28) using the detailed ARM processor model [25]. This model
approximates a modern out-of-order ARM core and was configured with 32KB
L1 instruction and data caches and a 1MB L2 cache, running at a 1GHz clock
speed. Performance statistics for a full run of the encryption and decryption
code report an average of 1.5 instructions per cycle committed. Encryption
and tag generation performed on 64B blocks comes at a processing cost of 63.1
cycles per byte while decryption and tag verification are measured to be 63.8
cycles per byte. This leads to a peak throughput of 126 Mbps.
Modern ARM cores that are similar in microarchitecture to the gem5
model, such as those offered by Samsung or Qualcomm, are designed with a




An open-source AES-GCM module from OpenCores was modified to
behave in a similar manner to other papers that have assumed the existence of
an authentication and encryption module [28]. The module used is intended to
be used in the 128b key mode of AES and has an integrated Galois Field Mul-
tiplier that implements the required multiplication operations for GCM. The
field multiplier is a 16b multiplier capable of processing an AES state block in
8 cycles. This strikes a reasonable tradeoff between high-width operations and
speed of processing. The AES-GCM module also has a mutable key, meaning
that the key is capable of being changed in between any major operations,
but not during an operation. This capability is important as previous works,
such as those discussed in Chapter 2, have stipulated that keys used for these
operations need the ability to be changed after certain events such as a counter
overflow or an operating system directive to flush or change keys.
The referenced open-source module used for these studies was not orig-
inally perfectly suited for comparison and a number of modifications were
made in order to make it more suitable. An additional top level module was
written to route traffic to and from a parameterizable number of the original
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AES-GCM modules. This allowed for relatively easy comparisons and mea-
surements with varying module counts without the requirement of changing
the top level interface. Several minor modifications were also made to the
original code. Some of the original state machines were modified. The GCM
specification includes the ability to authenticate additional data (AAD) that
is not encrypted. The original code faithfully includes this part of the speci-
fication, but is not needed for this study as the intention of almost all of the
referenced previous work is to encrypt all data to and from external memory.
Therefore, this capability was removed and state machines were made to more
closely adhere to only the needed capabilities.
Table 5.1 compares the modified open-source module, implemented on
a Kintex 7 FPGA, against the advertised specifications of a AES-GCM module
available through Xilinx [29]. The open-source module compares well against
the advertised specifications of the commercial module and is of slightly lower
performance with slightly lower resource usage to compensate.
The modified AES-GCM module was taken through the toolflow of
both Xilinx ISE (v. 14.3) and Synopsys Design Vision (v. E-2010.12) [30]
[31]. In both cases, up to 16 AES-GCM modules were synthesized, because it
was determined that numbers greater than 16 were increasingly prohibitively
long to synthesize and evaluate.
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Table 5.1: Open-Source vs. Commercial AES-GCM RTL Module on Kintex 7
Metric Open Source Commercial
Startup 19 clocks 0 clocks
16B Enc/Dec 22 clocks 12 clocks
16B Tag(Hash) 17 clocks 12 clocks
64B Cache Line + Tag 123 clocks 60 clocks
Freq. Max 212 MHz 256 MHz
Logic Slices ˜800 ˜1000
Block RAMs 8 12
5.1 FPGA Implementation
Power estimates of a single AES-GCM module for the Xilinx Kintex
7 FPGA target are reported in Table 5.2. Xilinx XPower Analyzer was used
to estimate power for a single AES-GCM module with the clock speed set
to 200 MHz, slightly slower than the maximum reported attainable speed
of 212 MHz. Other settings besides clock speed were left at default for these
estimates and both the “typical” and “worst-case” power usage estimates were
collected. The typical and worst-case usage estimates seem to mainly differ in
static power dissipation, with dynamic dissipation minimally affected. Some
other settings, such as flip-flop toggle rate, were increased or decreased and
showed little variation. Changing the flip-flop toggle rate from 12.5 to 100
increased the estimated power consumption by less than 10% whereas other
settings had even lesser effects.
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Table 5.2: Power Estimates for Single AES-GCM Module
Target Clock Speed Dynamic Static Total
FPGA (typical) 200 MHz 228 mW 123 mW 351 mW
FPGA (worst) 200 MHz 230 mW 371 mW 601 mW
ASIC (typical) 225 MHz 11.956 mW 0.428 mW 12.384 mW
5.2 ASIC Implementation
Power estimates for a single AES-GCM module synthesized with Syn-
opsys Design Vision [31] and targeting the FreePDK45 library [32] are reported
in Table 5.2. FreePDK is an open-source 45nm cell library commonly used in
academic settings. The same code that was used in Section 5.1 was used for
this synthesis, with all of the modifications intact. The maximum attainable
clock speed reported by the synthesis tools was 250 MHz for a single mod-
ule and slightly lower for multiple modules; therefore the target clock speed
was set at a conservative 225 MHz for all synthesized designs. The power esti-
mates for all Design Vision designs are “typical” use case power estimates. The
FreePDK library that was used does not provide “worst case” power estimates.
5.3 Hardware Power Dissipation
Figure 5.1 provides more detailed information on the estimated power
consumption of a set of AES-GCM modules synthesized for the Kintex 7. In
order to more accurately characterize the incremental power consumption of
adding more modules, a linear regression was applied to the data, resulting in
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the following equations.
powertypical FPGA(modules) = 192.9 ∗modules+ 216.3(mW ) (5.1)
powerworst FPGA(modules) = 199.4 ∗modules+ 462.7(mW ) (5.2)
Unsurprisingly, a simple linear regression fits the power estimates very well,
indicating that adding bandwidth (modules) to a proposed system for memory
authentication and encryption should scale linearly.
Figure 5.2 shows the power usage estimates for an ASIC implementation
of the AES-GCM module(s) at a 45nm technology node. A linear fit trend was
applied to the data resulting from synthesis of 1, 2, 4, 8, and 16 AES-GCM
modules and indicates a linear increase in power consumption along with the
number of modules, resulting in the following equation.
powertypical ASIC(modules) = 11.05 ∗modules+ 2.12(mW ) (5.3)
5.4 Hardware Resource Consumption
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 provide measurements of the resource consumption
of the synthesized AES-GCM modules. In the case of Figure 5.3 the measure-
ments are of Look-Up Tables (LUTs) and Flip-Flops (FFs). Block RAMs are
not pictured because exactly 8 RAMs are required per module. In the case of
Figure 5.4 the measurements are in terms of the native unit of measurement
of the FreePDK library, which is square micrometers (µm2).
30
Figure 5.1: FPGA Power Consumption Estimates for AES-GCM Modules
31
Figure 5.2: ASIC Power Consumption Estimates for AES-GCM Modules
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In both the FPGA and ASIC implementations, the resource consump-
tion scales linearly with the number of instances of the module, as shown by the
following linear trend fits applied to the data for FPGA resource consumption
and synthesized ASIC area.
resourcesFPGA(modules) = 1509.7 ∗modules− 222.5(FFs)
+ 2356.2 ∗modules− 81.4(LUTs)
+ 8 ∗modules(BRAMs)
(5.4)
areaASIC(modules) = 74125 ∗modules+ 34762(µm2) (5.5)
The FPGA implementation consumes approximately 1500 FFs and 2400 LUTs
per module, which fits well with the preliminary estimate of approximately 800
logic slices per module. Each logic slice encompasses multiple FFs and LUTs in
the Kintex 7 architecture. The ASIC implementation includes all synthesized
logic, FFs, and RAMs.
Combining the results in Section 5.3 and Section 5.4, we are able to
calculate an estimate of the power
area
dissipation. These results are presented





Figure 5.3: FPGA Resource Consumption for AES-GCM Modules
Table 5.3: ASIC Power / Area for AES-GCM Modules
Modules Area(µm2) Power(mW ) Density( W
mm2
)
1 89k 12.383 0.139
2 176k 24.732 0.140
4 343k 48.724 0.142
8 657k 95.277 0.145
16 1204k 183.162 0.152
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Table 6.1 summarizes all of the relevant metrics for the various im-
plementation methods discussed in this work. The clock rates reported are
the speeds at which the modules were tested, which, in the case of the ASIC
and FPGA implementations, was slightly lower than the maximum attainable
clock speed reported by synthesis tools. The clock rates for x86 were forced to
one speed by disabling power management and the Alpha clock was fixed in
SimpleScalar. The throughput rates reported here are for 64B of data (cache
line sized) with tag generation or authentication. Encryption and decryption
speeds were averaged for each implementation for the purposes of calculating
throughput.
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Table 6.1: Summary of Different Implementation Methods
ASIC FPGA x86 x86 x86 Alpha ARM
C Assembly ISA Ext.
Clock (Hz) 225 M 200 M 2.7 G 2.7 G 2.7 G 900 M 1 G
Cycles
Byte















Typ. Power 11.05 mW 192.9 mW 35 W 35 W 35 W 94 W 2 W
(TDP) (TDP) (TDP) (TDP)
Typ. Area 74.1kµm2 - - - - - -
Mbps/mW 84.7 4.57 0.0140 0.0281 0.176 0.00186 0.063
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Table 6.2: Memory Bandwidth of Several Modern Mobile Systems
Nexus 7 Nexus 10 iPhone 5 iPad 3
Peak DRAM BW (GB
s
) 5.3 12.8 8.5 12.8











Power estimates are restated here from Figures 5.1 and 5.2, Intel doc-
umentation [33], and Chapter 4.
Once a final metric of throughput
power
has been computed, it is easier to com-
pare these different implementation methods for the task of memory encryption
and authentication. The various software solutions can be seen to be inferior
due to their high power consumption at several magnitudes lower efficiency
compared to both FPGA and ASIC implementations. ISA extensions allow
modern software solutions to eclipse the studied hardware solutions in terms of
pure performance per instance by a significant margin, but at the cost of high
power. Although not directly compared here, the area dedicated to obtaining
this functionality is also significantly smaller for an ASIC solution.
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6.1 Evaluating Feasibility of Implementation
Modern PC systems have peak memory bandwidths up to 25.6 and 21
GB
s
(204 to 168 Gb
s
) for the highest-performing desktop Intel [34] and AMD
[35] processors currently available. Modern mobile systems such as tablets
and phones are increasingly powerful as well; several representative systems
are presented in Table 6.2 [36] [37] [38] [39]. It can be seen that peak band-
width for mobile systems has almost reached parity with traditional comput-
ing systems, in packages that are more power-constrained, making feasibility
of implementation for any memory protection system even more important.
Though memory bandwidth is not saturated during typical operation,
it is easy to conclude that the capabilities provided for memory encryption and
authentication must at least meet the peak bandwidth in order to maintain
an acceptable level of performance. For example, in Yan et al. [9], discussed
previously, the bandwidth provided by the 12 AES-GCM hardware modules
would account for a peak theoretical processing rate of 1.5 Tb
s
, significantly
more than any modern system.
Using only the data for the Intel system mentioned above, we can make
an assessment of feasibility for the different methods of implementation.
6.1.1 Embedded Software Implementation
For the methods evaluated in Chapter 4, implementation of enough
x86 instances to satisfy peak bandwidth requirements of 25.6 GB
s
would take
approximately 590, 210, and 34 instances for C, assembly, and assembly with
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ISA extension methods, respectively. Implementation of enough ARM cores
to satisfy peak bandwidth requirements would take just over 1600 instances.
Implementation of Alpha cores was not considered due to extremely low effi-
ciency. The power budget and silicon area that would have to be dedicated to
any of these implementations would be tremendous and would make a design
based on these methods ultimately untenable.
6.1.2 FPGA Implementation
For the FPGA method evaluated in Section 5.1, implementation of
enough instances to satisfy the same peak bandwidth requirements would take
approximately 230 AES-GCM modules, as described in Chapter 5. This would
come at a power cost of approximately 44.7 W, following the regression curve
described previously in Chapter 5. Additionally, this number of modules would
not be able to be synthesized into the particular FPGA that was used for this
work; a larger, more expensive, and likely more power-hungry chip would have
to be used instead.
An interesting line of thought is that a much less aggressive processing
core, implemented in an FPGA, may be able to be modified with an appro-
priate number of memory encryption and authentication modules to provide
security and reasonable performance, all on the same chip. A smaller number
of modules would easily fit in the FPGA with room to spare and would not
consume a large amount of power. This warrants further research into imple-




For the ASIC method evaluated in Section 5.2, implementation of
enough instances to satisfy the same peak bandwidth requirements would take
approximately 220 modules as described in Chapter 5. This would consume
power at approximately 2.4 W, following the regression curve previously de-
scribed in Chapter 5. Additionally, an implementation following this method
would require approximately 16.3 mm2 of silicon area at a 45 nm process,
again following the regressions described previously.
These costs are much more reasonable than any of the software-based
or the FPGA-based solutions described in this work. In short, it seems that
implementation of memory encryption and authentication through an ASIC
solution is reasonable while software and FPGA-based solutions are simply




There are a number of ways in which this work can be extended. This
will be briefly discussed in this Chapter.
First, information about cache area and power should be integrated
with the AES-GCM modules. Almost all of the previous work on hardware
memory authentication and encryption designs include a cache dedicated for
use with the tags for memory blocks. These caches are an integral part of
the system and are considered to be the best way to reduce the performance
penalty of memory encryption and authentication. This was not modeled in
this work and would serve to make a more complete power and area estimation
for such a system.
Second, modeling the effect of tree-traversal for the described tree of
counter, hash, or tag values would more accurately characterize performance
and power penalties.
Third, additional data points at different process nodes for ASIC im-
plementations of AES-GCM modules would serve to better characterize this
work, especially in terms of the embedded market where process technologies
typically lag behind high-performance processes.
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Fourth, analyzing more RTL implementations of AES-GCM modules
or even other modes of AES implemented in hardware would serve to more
closely parallel previous work. Not all of the previous work in this area used
AES-GCM, and other modes of operation may have differing hardware costs.
Fifth, power annotation into a performance simulator would serve to





The work described in this thesis demonstrates that implementation
costs should be a significant factor in the evaluation of both past and future
work on topics in the field of memory encryption and authentication.
Chapter 4 covered implementation and analysis concerning software so-
lutions. Solutions ranging from a pure, portable C implementation to augmen-
tation with hand-coded assembly to full-on ISA extensions with hand-coded
assembly were considered. The conclusion was that software implementations
of the required primitives to enable AES-GCM operations and to process data
are very expensive in terms of power and do not provide a suitable amount
of performance to justify their power budget or implementation complexity.
Portable software solutions that may be considered as a “drop-in” solution
have been demonstrated to have less than acceptable performance considering
the amount of hardware and power that would have to be dedicated to run
these algorithms. Architectures with ISA extensions, such as modern versions
of x86, can perform on par with dedicated hardware, but come at the cost
of very high power dissipation. Overall, the approach of assuming a software
solution to the memory encryption and authentication problem is infeasible.
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Chapter 5 covered implementation and analysis of an open-source hard-
ware module capable of performing all of the required operations to enable a
solution to the memory encryption and authentication problem in both FPGA
and ASIC formats.
The FPGA implementation of the module shows promise as a poten-
tial solution to be added onto an existing or new design that already targets
an FPGA. The resources consumed on an FPGA are considerable for each
module and a large number of modules would quickly consume a majority
of the FPGA resources, having the effect of restricting the usefulness of the
FPGA and potentially slowing clock speeds with routing-induced delay. The
power dissipation for the FPGA implementation is non-trivial but remains well
within the capabilities of the FPGA to dissipate, as confirmed by the Xilinx
tools. However, a significant increase in dynamic power consumption can be
expected if hardware modules enabling memory encryption and authentication
functionality are added to a design previously lacking them.
Implementation of the hardware module as an ASIC at a 45 nm pro-
cess node shows promise as a reasonable, though non-trivial, solution. Power
dissipation on the order of ˜10 mW per module indicate that solutions of a
similar nature may be feasible to implement as part of a larger system. The
analysis conducted in Chapter 6 also shows that it is possible to meet the
peak memory bandwidth requirements of modern systems using modules of
this type.
The analysis of Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show a linear relationship between
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the number of AES-GCM modules and power dissipation for a design. Al-
though not unexpected, this result indicates that a design needing anything
more than minimum memory performance would need to carefully consider the
implications of power dedicated to hardware memory encryption and authen-
tication as a first-order design constraint. The works discussed in Chapter 2
assume the existence of at least one, but typically many more, engines capa-
ble of performing the low-level work necessary to encrypt and authenticate
memory traffic. This work has shown that, as more modules are assumed to
be required, area and power can become significant concerns, especially for
modern processors that have a large amount of memory bandwidth.
For systems that may not require a large number of hardware modules,
the picture is more optimistic. A small number of modules may be integrated
into a design without too much of a power or area requirement. For small num-
bers, power dissipation would only increase a maximum of a few dozens of mW
and area would increase by approximately 1 mm2, assuming a 45 nm process.
The integration of these modules, along with some additional hardware such
as a dedicated counter cache and appropriate control logic would contribute
significantly to enabling secure memory encryption and authentication.
This work contributes an analysis of the feasibility of memory encryp-
tion and authentication for the implementation methods included in previous
Chapters. We have expanded the work done by previous researchers by tak-
ing an in-depth look at the characteristics of several implementations of the
necessary primitives to enable memory encryption and authentication, leading
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to the conclusion that additional power dissipation and area usage will have
to be a first-order design constraint and that the only feasible implementation
method is with ASICs integrated directly into the design of a system.
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